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Abstract
The SO2 trading program has achieved reductions in emissions ahead of schedule, with
allowance prices below the marginal costs that were anticipated for the program.  This paper
explores the experience with the program and proposes a taxonomy of reasons why allowance
prices are low.  The overarching reason is that the most costly investments to accommodate
full emission reductions have been successfully delayed.  Application of a discount rate to these
long run marginal costs yields an estimate of allowance price close to that observed today.
Several factors have contributed to the delay in bearing these costs, and helped to reduce their
magnitude.  One group of factors stems from market fundamentals, especially the cost of rail
transport of low sulfur coal.  A second group includes the influences of state and federal
regulators.  A third group includes distinctions from the “imagined” program compared to that
which was actually been enacted.-1-
SO2 Allowance Trading: How Experience and Expectations Measure Up
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1.   INTRODUCTION
The sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowance trading program enacted through Title IV
of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) ushered in the first nationwide effort to use a
market in tradable "emission allowances" as the way to encourage the electricity industry to
minimize the cost of reducing emissions.  The electricity industry is allocated a fixed number of
total allowances and firms are required to hold one allowance for each ton of sulfur dioxide
they emit.  Firms may choose to buy allowances to meet their requirement rather than reduce
emissions, or to sell excess allowances not required for compliance.
Since the first phase of the program began in January, 1995, the experience has been
full of pleasant surprises.  Firms are reducing emissions in excess of statutory requirements in
Phase I and accumulating an unexpectedly large bank of allowances for use in the second phase
of the program that begins in January 2000.  Probably the most surprising development has
been the decline in the price for allowances, compared with the expectations of many analysts
at the inception of the program.  Also the cost of emission reductions using low sulfur coal or
flue gas scrubbing equipment has been lower than expected.  At the same time, it appears that
the volume of allowance trading to date, while substantial, has been less than analysts had first
believed necessary to take full advantage of allowance trading.  Hence, there is an apparent
puzzle: greater than expected cost savings have been achieved under the allowance trading
program with a lower than expected level of trading (Conrad and Kohn, 1996, offer another
perspective on a similar question).
                                               
1 Douglas R. Bohi, Charles River Associates, Inc.; Dallas Burtraw, Quality of the Environment Division,
Resources for the Future.  The authors are grateful for research assistance from Brian Kropp, Ron Lile and Erin
Mansur, and comments from Curtis Carlson.Bohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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An explanation for these observations is called for not only for evaluation of the current
program, but also to arrive at lessons that might guide the use of tradable permit programs in
other applications in the future.  This is especially important with respect to the differences
between expectations of allowance prices and their current value, because some analysts assert
that engineers and economists so overstated the cost of meeting SO2 reductions that their cost
projections for future environmental regulations such as carbon dioxide controls should be
discounted significantly.
This paper will evaluate the experience with the emission trading program to date and
explain why the surprises indicated above came to pass.  We offer a taxonomy of reasons why
allowance prices are below the expectations of some.  The lesson is not so much that prior
estimates were wrong (at least the more sophisticated and unbiased ones) but that they were
static snapshots taken in a dynamic policy environment.  We argue the program should be
given credit for the attainment of cost savings in emissions reductions because it has provided
incentives for firms to innovate and to exploit advantageous trends in fuel markets and in the
industry.  Nonetheless, there have been impediments to trading allowances and other
idiosyncrasies in program design that have promoted uneconomic investments and prevented
firms from realizing additional savings.  The experience to date illustrates that the potential
savings from incentive based environmental policies such as the allowance trading program are
enormous.  However, improvements in trading behavior will be increasingly important for the
industry to capture these savings as it approaches the more stringent second phase of the
program.  Due to increasingly competitive pressures to reduce costs in electricity generation,
we are optimistic that a boost in allowance trading will be realized, but this is far from certain.
2.  AN  EXPERIMENT  IN  REGULATORY  REFORM
In contrast to traditional command and control environmental regulation, where firms
typically adopt a common technology to reduce emissions by a specific amount, the emissionBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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trading program allows each firm to choose its own individual emission rate and the means to
achieve that rate.  This flexibility allows firms to identify the cheapest way to reduce its
compliance costs.  Allowance trading takes advantage of the fact that emission control costs
vary across different generating plants, and encourages firms with the cheapest control costs to
undertake the most emission reduction.
To work in this idealized way, however, each firm must have the incentive to minimize
its costs.  One should be careful in assuming that electric utilities will seek to, or even will be
allowed to, minimize the cost of reducing emissions.  The problem is that electric utilities are
not allowed to maximize their profits.  Instead, their prices and profits are regulated by the
states in which they operate.  The state regulators allow the firms to charge prices for electricity
that will recover only those costs of production that are deemed to be prudently incurred.
In fact, many state public utility regulators have imposed cost recovery rules that
distort the firms' incentive to minimize costs (see Rose, 1997; Bohi, 1994; Rose, 1992; and
Bohi and Burtraw, 1992).  For example, regulators typically allow more favorable cost
recovery on scrubbing and fuel switching than on allowance purchases.  Several states have
granted preapproval for the recovery of scrubber costs.  Investments in capital costs such as
scrubbers or fuel handling equipment in the case of fuel switching can be depreciated or
expensed beginning as soon as facilities are in operation, and in some states scrubber costs can
be recovered even before the units are in operation.  Fuel cost increases are typically passed
through to customers in the year the expense is incurred.  In contrast, though allowance
acquisitions may be necessary for investment and planning purposes years in advance of their
use, their cost cannot be recovered until after the allowances are used for compliance.  If the
price of an allowance falls over the period of time between acquisition and use the state
regulator may deny full recovery of cost on the grounds that a particular transaction was
imprudent.  If the price rises and the utility decides to sell the allowances and adopt a differentBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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compliance strategy, the utility is unlikely to be able to capture the capital gains.  Hence, the
utility faces a downside risk for which there is no upside compensation.
In summary, the potential savings from allowance trading are tremendous but for a
variety of reasons firms may have an incentive to pursue abatement options over allowances
transactions even when they appear to be more expensive.  Several studies have estimated a
high cost associated with impediments to trading (Fullerton et al., 1996; Winnebrake et al.,
1995; USGAO, 1994). For a dissenting view on whether state regulators have impeded
trading, see Bailey (1996).
In the last year, apparently despite these impediments, there has been a tremendous
boost in allowance trading (Dean and Kruger, 1997).  One reason may be that regulators have
corrected the early signals given to utilities, but evidence of this is lacking.  It is more likely the
case that the potentially achievable cost savings from trading overwhelm the restrictive signals
issued by some regulators, especially as utilities come to recognize the oncoming pressures of
competition set in motion by the 1992 Energy Policy Act.  While many have complained that
regulators stopped paying attention to emission trading in 1992 (Rose, 1997), it may turn out
to be a good thing.2
3.   OBSERVATIONS  OF  THE  EARLY  PERFORMANCE
Four interrelated aspects of the experience with the emission trading program deserve
to be highlighted and they are listed in Table 1.  First, the volume of sulfur dioxide actually
emitted since the law was passed in 1990, and before it took effect in 1995, is significantly
lower than expected.3  Utilities have been aggressive in taking advantage of the opportunity to
                                               
2 One utility employee told us that the utility had stopped filing the burdensome paperwork that the public
utility commission required to be filed for every allowance transaction.  So far, he reported, the regulators did
not notice or care.
3 Projections by both ICF (1989), p. 24, and Molburg et al. (1991) Table 5.1, p. 47, showed emissions rising
steadily from 1985 to 1995 when the new Clean Air Act requirements went into effect.  Instead, emissions rose
only to 1990, the year the Clean Air Act was enacted, and dropped steadily thereafter.  For a comparison of
these studies see Reid, Bohi and Burtraw (1994).Bohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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save allowances earned through emission reduction actions, and the volume of "banked"
allowances that will be available for use in Phase II of the program is larger than expected.
The bank represents a "win-win" outcome for the environment and for industry.  The early
reductions provide an opportunity for environmental recovery and improved public health at an
earlier point in time than would occur otherwise, while the bank provides an opportunity for
industry to lower its overall costs of compliance and the ability to ease into the more stringent
Phase II.  Estimates of the volume of banked allowances expected to accumulate during Phase
I range between 7 and 15 million. White et al. (1995) estimate the allowance bank will reach
9.4 million tons in the year 2000.  RDI (1995) estimates the bank will reach 12-15 million.  In
1991 the estimate of total Phase I banked allowances made for the Department of Energy
(DOE) was only 4.35 million (Molburg et al., 1991, Table 4.10, p. 44).  The more recent
estimates of the Phase I bank are equivalent to 25% to 50% of the allocation of allowances
during the first five-year phase of the program.
Table 1:  Four observations of SO2 allowance trading to date.
1. Over-compliance in Phase I will lead to a substantial bank for Phase II.
2. The volume of allowance trading has been less than anticipated.
3. The price of allowances is low.
4. The cost of emission reductions is low.
A second observation is that the volume of allowance trading has been less than many
anticipated.  The overwhelming portion of the approximately 53 million private allowances
transferred in 3,300 transactions that have been recorded through the EPA's Allowance
Tracking System were accounting transfers within firms.  A relatively small percentage,
roughly about six to ten percent, were economic transfers between independent parties.  The
actual number of economic transfers is not easily deciphered from the allowance data.  Three
efforts to identify economic transfers that reach somewhat different conclusions are reported inBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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Table 1.  As of the middle of 1995, White et al. (1995) find less than 1.6 million allowances
have been traded among utilities.  Joskow et al. (1996) find that as of the first quarter of 1996
about 6.5 million allowances have been traded among utilities, between utilities and third
parties and between non-utility parties.  In addition, 775,000 allowances have been purchased
at EPA auctions (excluding allowances offered for sale by private parties through the auction).
Dean and Kruger (1997) report that economically meaningful transactions (defined as
allowances acquisitions by utilities) involving 4.8 million allowances had occurred as of the end
of 1996.  Lile et al. (1996) review the issues involved in these assessments and promote the
perspective developed in Dean and Kruger. Montero, Ellerman and Schmalensee (1996) find
that for compliance in 1995, "spatial" trading (as opposed to "inter-temporal" trading, or
banking) account for about 500,000 out of 5.3 million tons from facilities covered by the
program in Phase I.  About two-thirds of this trading was intra-utility, and only one-third
(involving primarily six utilities) was inter-utility, representing about 3% of allowances used for
compliance.
The data suggest that a good number of utilities have failed to take advantage of the
allowance market to reduce their costs of compliance, though most have taken advantage of
the flexibility in the allowance trading program to bank allowances for Phase II, and to pursue
fuel switching.
Eighty-five percent of the base allowances issued in the first phase (excluding facilities in
the Substitution and Compensation Program) go to utilities located in only eleven states (see
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2).  All of the states may be said to actively reduce the incentive to
trade.  For example, all of the states proscribe that the benefits that may result from allowance
trading will be passed on to customers.  The State of Connecticut provides the one exception to
this rule, wherein it allowed a utility to retain 15% of the revenue from the sale of allowances
(Rose, 1997).  In addition, six states provide a regulatory bias in favor of scrubbers as a
compliance option (column 3).  All six states have significant indigenous coal industries andBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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have acted to protect their markets against encroachment from lower sulfur coal.  Out of 110
affected generation facilities, 26 generating units at 14 facilities opted for scrubbing and all of
these units are located in states with a regulatory bias in favor of scrubbing.
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Missouri 6.2 No No Sell Switching Only





Alabama 4.1 No Intrafirm Sell Switching Only
New York 2.7 No No Sell Switching;
Scrub 2 units
Florida 2.4 No No Buy Switching Only
TOTAL 85.0
SOURCES: Column (3) and (4) from interviews with public utility commission staff; Column (5) from ICF model
with "Low-Flexible" assumptions, reported in National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, 1990 Integrated
Assessment Report, p. 425; and Column (6) from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "SO2 Phase I and II Boiler
Compliance Methods," Office of Air and Radiation, June 14, 1993.Bohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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One indication of the unexpected nature of the amount of allowance trading so far is
reflected in the discrepancies between the expected status of the utilities in each state as a buyer
or seller of allowances (column 5) and the actual compliance plans (column 4).  The lack of
correspondence between plans and estimates is of interest because the ICF optimization model
was the primary source of estimates of the efficiency gains from a system of allowance trading
that was used in the political debate over the acid rain provisions in the CAAA.  Though the
costs of the program have been low, experience so far suggests that the promised benefits of
allowance trading are not being realized in the way they were initially expected.
Another indication of the amount of trading is illustrated in Figure 1.  Arrayed along the
horizontal axis of this figure are utilities (at the holding company level) according to the number
of total allowances allocations they are to receive between 1995 and 2026.  The vertical axis is a
ratio of the amount of "economically distinct" transactions each utility has been involved in to
their total allowance allocation.  We include intra-utility trades, which could be more important
for the larger firms and holding companies.  The ratio captures our intuition that utilities with
more allowances should be more involved in trading, so one might expect the ratios across firms
to be approximately equal if all firms attempted to take equal advantage of the market.  The
variation in these ratios suggests that utilities vary greatly in the amount of activity in the market,
even when we control for their size and allowance allocations.
A third and particularly important observation is that the price of allowances has been
lower than expected.  Table 3 reports expected and actual allowance prices and the volume of
inter-utility trades.  Prior to the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1990, the
estimated price of allowances ran as high as $1500, a number that was enshrined in the Act as
the fixed price of direct sales by EPA.  During 1990, the EPA cited a price estimate of $750 as
the best guess of what allowances (and emission reductions at the margin) would cost.-9-
Total Number of Economically Distinct Allowances Bought/Sold 
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Instead, actual prices for inter-utility trades have been considerably lower, starting out in the
range of $250-300 in 1992, they fell steadily to $110-140 in 1995, and to around $70 in 1996
before rebounding to the low $90s at the time of this writing.





Quantity of Inter-Utility Trades
(thousands)





1992 $250-$300 70   130
1993 $130-$300 $157 639   226
1994 $130-$140 $159 562 1,467
1995 $110-$140 $132    320*** 4,918
1996 $90  $66 4,800****
Notes:  The expected price in 1989 is from ICF (1989), and in 1990 it is from White et al. (1995). Actual prices and
trading volumes are from White et al. (1995), Joskow et al. (1996) and the industry press.     *White et al. (1995) report
inter-utlity trades.     **Joskow et al. (1996) report trades between April and March of the subsequent year, and include
inter-utility trades, trades between utilities and third parties, and trades between two non-utility parties.     ***Data for
1995 is for first half of year only.     ****Dean and Kruger (1997) report all allowance acquisitions by utilities through
the end of 1996.








ICF (1989) 3.3 - 4.7 2.7 - 4.0
Van Horn Consulting
 et al.  (1993) 5.1 3.4 2.2
GAO (1994) 4.3 2.5 1.4
Burtraw, et al.  (1997) 2.5 1.0
A fourth observation, also related to the price of allowances, is that the cost of
emission reductions has been dramatically less than industry projections before adoption of the
program.  Table 4 presents four sets of estimates compiled at various times of the relativeBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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annual costs in Phase II for three implementation scenarios:  command and control,
constrained trading (only among facilities within a firm), and interutility trading.
The estimates pertain to annual cost when the net contributions to the allowance bank
are zero sometime in Phase II.  The estimates illustrate an evolution as utility compliance plans
have become known and set into motion, and new information has surfaced about compliance
options and their costs.  According to estimates made by ICF (1989) for the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) before the CAAA was enacted, the levelized annual cost of the
program was expected to be $2.7 - 4.0 billion.  These costs reflect a cost savings of 40% over a
command and control approach.  The GAO study in 1994 also estimated that compliance costs
in the year 2001 would be almost 40 percent less than they would have been under a command
and control approach of emission rate limits applied to specific facilities, but costs in both cases
were less than forecast in 1989.  Specific technology requirements, which were also considered
in various proposals in the 1980s, would have been even more expensive.  The Burtraw et al.
(1997) study differs from the others, which were primarily engineering based studies, by
employing an econometric analysis.  They find that permit trading would reduce the costs of the
program by 60% compared with a command and control approach.
4.   WHY  ARE  ALLOWANCE  PRICES  SO  LOW?
In this section we reconcile the most widely discussed of the discrepancies between
experience and expectations: Why allowance prices are so low?  The answer, in this case at
least, is not that the experts are wrong.  In fact, the explanations for the divergence between
expectations and observed allowance prices are several, and can be organized into three
groups, as listed in Table 5.  First are market fundamentals, which is analogous to the term
used in financial economics that describe changes that have driven down marginal costs of
compliance.  Second are regulatory influences that also work to reduce observed allowanceBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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prices to date.  Third are the distinctions between the imagined program that was the subject of
many analyses, and the actual program as set forth in the Clean Air Act.
Table 5:  Nine reasons why allowance prices are so low.
Market Fundamentals:
1.  Discounting of future costs.
2.  Widespread availability of low sulfur coal.
3.  Competition and innovation.
4.  General equilibrium effects.
Regulatory Influences:
5.  Sunk “uneconomic” investments in scrubbers.
6.  Annual auction invites strategic under-bidding.
The Imagined versus Real Program:
7.  Bonus allowances subsidies for scrubbing delay future costs.
8.  Two phases of program segregate sellers and buyers.
9.  Substitution and Compensation units delay future costs.
Market Fundamentals
1. Marginal cost estimates that will be incurred in the future should be discounted to the present
to be relevant for current allowance prices.
The single most important factor in comparing the marginal costs of the program with
observed allowance prices to date is the role of discounting.  An investment of $126 that is to
be made in the year 2000 for the purpose of compliance has a present value of (1-d)
3 128 in
1997, where d represents a discount rate.  For instance if d=.08, then the investment in the
year 2000 has a present value in 1997 of $100.  Furthermore, anything that happens to delay
this investment beyond the year 2000 serves to lower its present value.
Most analyses of long run marginal costs which were used for allowance price
projections were built on models that accommodated full implementation of Phase II of Title
IV, which will be felt when the bank from Phase I is drawn down and net contributions to the
bank are zero.  The bank is expected to be exhausted toward the end of the next decade.
Table 6 reports several estimates along with the net present value (NPV) of the long runBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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marginal costs obtained by discounting these estimates at a rate of 8% per year (real),
assuming these marginal costs were incurred in the year 2010.  White et al. (1995) suggest an
8% real discount rate as a benchmark, above the after-tax weighted average cost of capital
(5% real), to account for increased risk as the industry enters a more competitive era, and
uncertainty around the allowance market.  White et al. (1995) and ICF (1995) are engineering
studies of marginal costs.  The RDI (1995) estimates are projections of allowance prices,
rather than marginal costs per se, so the comparison with the engineering estimates is
somewhat misleading.  Several of the complementary explanations we discuss below have
helped to delay the time at which these investments would be needed, thereby lowering the
price of allowances in the present.
Table 6.  Estimates of the long run marginal cost of emission reductions, and the role of
discounting future costs for present allowance transactions.
Long Run Marginal Cost
Estimates Net Present Value









Burtraw et al. (1997) $284 $97
Notes: * RDI (1995) estimates are for allowance prices rather than marginal costs.
2. Low price and widespread availability of low sulfur coal.
Low sulfur fuel appears to account for about half of the emission reductions in Phase I,
but more importantly it accounts for emission reductions at the margin, serving to set marginal
costs and allowance prices.  The most important aspect in the trend toward lower compliance
costs is that, while the demand for low sulfur coal has gone up, the price has gone down due to
dynamic changes in coal markets.  Also, there is roughly equal access to low-priced coal to all
utilities affected by Phase I regardless of their location.Bohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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The relevant factor for determining the marginal cost of fuel switching or blending as a
compliance option is the difference between low and high sulfur fuel, termed the "sulfur premium."
This premium widened in 1990, but then stabilized and narrowed in most states since then.
Surprisingly, the shift in demand toward low sulfur coal did not cause the price of low sulfur coal
or the sulfur premium to rise.  Thus, switching to low sulfur coal did not entail a major economic
burden, as some analysts for electricity industry had predicted it would in the 1980s.4
After Phase II requirements are in place in 2000, the range of sulfur content in coal that
achieves compliance is cut to about half that in Phase I.  Focusing demand on this narrower
range of coals will test the capability of the supply system to deliver low sulfur coal at stable
prices.  Two questions are central to the determination of future compliance costs.  Is it
possible to further increase the infrastructure and efficiency in transporting coal from Wyoming
to the east?  Is the low sulfur coal resource base east of the Mississippi large enough to
continue to be an important source of supply to eastern utilities?
Scrubbers may be more important for meeting compliance requirements in the future.
For example, plants that were able to meet Phase I requirements by blending low and high
sulfur coals are likely to be faced with a choice between a switch to low sulfur coal or the
installation of a scrubber.  The capital costs associated with switching from high to low sulfur
coal is about 35% of the capital costs of a scrubber per kW of capacity.  In addition, if the
answer to either of the two questions raised above about the supply of low sulfur coal turns
out negative, and low sulfur coal is not as competitive in Phase II, scrubbers may be the
cheapest option for meeting the emissions cap.
                                               
4 In fact, one industry study suggested the costs of sulfur abatement would be higher if fuel switching played an
important role,  because although "intra-firm trading" would reduce expensive scrubbing it would increase
reliance on low sulfur coals resulting in an increased sulfur premium that would raise costs for units already
using low sulfur coal. (TBS, 1986).Bohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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3. Competition and innovation.
The minemouth price of low sulfur coal located in the Powder River Basin has always
been cheaper than eastern alternatives, but the geographic extent of the market has been limited
by transportation costs.  As noted by Ellerman and Montero (1996), Fieldston Company (1996)
and Burtraw (1996), the cost of rail transportation from the Powder River Basin to delivery
points east has fallen recently.  Because of competition created by the Staggers Rail Act of
1980, the cost of transportation from the Powder River Basin has declined from a rate of over
two mills per ton-mile in the early to mid 1980s to less than one mill per ton-mile today
(Ellerman and Montero, 1996), p 5).  Railroad competition has also reduced rail rates for
central Appalachian and midwestern coals, but by less than the reduction in Powder River Basin
rates for delivery to the midwest.  As reported by Burtraw (1996, p. 13), transportation rates
dropped from 20-26 mills per ton mile to 10-14 mills over the same period.
Another area of innovation has been coal-blending at the power plant.  The blending of
fuels with different sulfur contents was thought difficult before 1990.  Since that time engineers
have learned they can blend up to 40% low sulfur subbituminous coals with higher sulfur
bituminous coal, without incurring major capital expense or a decline in performance.
Yet another leading compliance option is scrubbing.  The cost of installing and
operating scrubbers has fallen in recent years, no doubt in response to competition from lower
sulfur coal while removal efficiencies have improved.  In addition, the fact that "a ton of
emissions saved is an allowance earned" gives an incentive for utilities and scrubber suppliers
to find ways to improve the efficiency of existing scrubbers.
4. General equilibrium effects
One source of systematic bias in engineering models and many economic models is the
failure to take into account all the opportunities that individuals in the economy have to alter the
investment and consumption behavior in  response to changes in prices.  For instance, sinceBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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electricity prices are affected by the SO2 program, consumers may decide to switch to other
sources of energy services at less cost.  Goulder et al. (1996) embed a ballpark estimate of
marginal technological abatement cost within a computable general equilibrium model.  This
model allows producers and consumers to substitute among alternatives as the price of electricity
changes reflecting expenditures on technological abatement.  These substitutions tend to amplify
emission reductions in their model; consequently, the environmental goal of a 10 million ton
reduction is achieved with less investment in technological abatement than would be anticipated
without such opportunities to substitute, and at a lower cost.  They find the general equilibrium
context to lower the private marginal abatement costs by 5 to 15 percent.
Regulatory Influences
5. Regulatory incentives promoted "uneconomic" scrubber investments that, once in place,
have low marginal cost.
Scrubbing accounts for about 50 percent of the emissions reductions in Phase I.  This
compliance option has been heavily promoted in some states by the legislatures and state public
utility commissions.  Scrubbing involves large up-front capital costs, an anathema in an
industry already burdened by excess generating capacity and facing the prospect that a
significant part of their capital costs cannot be fully recovered in a more competitive market.5
Although scrubbers have been installed on 14 plants (26 generating units) to meet Phase I
compliance requirements, their choice may not reflect an underlying economic advantage as
much as favorable regulatory treatment, as described previously.  In addition, 19 units qualified
for a significant bonus of emission allowances (3.5 million tons, or over 10 percent of the
allocation in the five years of Phase I) awarded by the CAAA to utilities that add scrubbers in
Phase I.  Even with these bonuses, these investments appear uneconomic ex post.  Although
from the current perspective capital cost of investments in retrofit scrubbers appear
                                               
5 Chao and Wilson (1993) estimate that the option value provided by holding allowances rather than scrubbing
is worth $85 per ton, although their calculations assume that the price of allowances is $400 per ton and the
elasticity of low sulfur coal is very low.Bohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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uneconomic, once in place their operating costs are low, perhaps $60-$90 per ton removed, so
they will be run to full capacity.  The operating costs of scrubbing do not determine the
marginal abatement cost, since they are fully utilized.  However, they reduce the need and
lower the marginal cost for other compliance options, thereby affecting allowance prices.
6. The annual auction provides incentives for buyers and sellers to understate their opportunity
costs, which may have an influence on allowance prices.
The auction design set forth in the statute is a discriminating price, sealed bid auction
that provides strategic incentives for bidders and sellers to understate their reservation prices
(Cason, 1993, 1995).  Whether this incentive has led to average auction prices that are biased
relative to opportunity costs is an open question.  Joskow, Schmalensee and Bailey (1996)
argue that the auction has been unimportant with regard to the performance of the allowance
trading program generally.  Furthermore, some utilities have argued that they could do better if
they were allowed to retain ownership of allowances that are allocated through the auction.
Ellerman and Montero (1996) suggest, however, that the auction played a useful role in the
early stages of the program in signaling the relatively low compliance costs that faced many
utilities.  Further, some brokers and utilities report that future allowance transactions are
hinged to the auction price, so that any change in the auction would disrupt the evolution of
the market.  Whether or not the auction design is amended in the future, evidence is consistent
with the notion that the annual auction is poorly designed and provides a price signal below
true opportunity costs.  Whether the influence of the auction is or is not important has not been
determined convincingly
The Imagined versus Real Program
7. Bonus allowances add to the surplus of allowances in the early stage of the program, with
downward pressure on price.
One aspect of Title IV that was not included in many early models of the program is
the role of bonus allowances for utilities that chose to meet emission reductions throughBohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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scrubbing.  These allowances expand the amount of Phase I allowances available by 3.5
million, over 10 percent of allocations in Phase I.  This increase in supply in the near term
places downward pressure on costs and on allowance prices by delaying the necessity of
abatement expenditures.
8. The two phases of the program segregate most potential allowance sellers into Phase I and
buyers into Phase II, resulting in a near term downward trend in the price of allowances.
Burtraw et al. (1997) estimate the mean marginal abatement cost weighted by emissions
at various facilities in 1994.  They find the cost for Phase I facilities in 1994 to be $60, and for
Phase II facilities to be $384.  This difference suggests that a substantial bank would accumulate
to delay the relatively more expensive abatement efforts that otherwise would be required from
Phase II facilities after 2000.  If the allowance market performed perfectly, the accumulation of
an allowance bank would not necessarily have an impact on the relationship between observable
allowance prices and marginal costs.  However, to the extent there are market imperfections,
less than perfectly rational planning, or regulatory intervention, the asymmetry between Phase I
and Phase II may exacerbate trends in the allowance market that are unrelated to technological
costs pushing down current allowance prices.
9. The opportunity to rely on Substitution and Compensation units further reduces the costs of
complying with Phase I emission reductions.
Substitution and Compensation units voluntarily brought into Phase I typically have the
lowest marginal costs of units affected in Phase II.  By opting into Phase I, managers at these
units can begin emission reductions at these units and delay reductions at other units by
building up their allowance bank.  Hence, to the extent that the surplus of allowances in
Phase I leads allowance prices to diverge from naive estimates of marginal abatement cost, this
trend would be exacerbated by the opportunity to use Substitution and Compensation units in
Phase I.Bohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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5.   CONCLUSION
The puzzle that has emerged from the early experience with the SO2 allowance trading
program is: Why are allowance prices so low, especially when trading volume appears to be
lower than expected?  This paper offers several answers to this question.  The conclusion that
emerges is that the institution of allowance trading and the flexibility it gives to firms has
enabled electric utilities to achieve environmental goal at dramatic reductions in costs,
compared to previous regulatory experience.  However, one must also consider the particular
aspects of this program that delay significantly the time at which future investments will be
incurred.  This often overlooked factor also contributes significantly to the low allowance
prices that have been observed in the first years of the program.Bohi and Burtraw RFF 97-24
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